The Armies and Enemies of Ancient China


1027 B.C.-1286 A.D.

by John P. Greer

A WARGAMES RESEARCH GROUP PRODUCTION
DEDICATION

This, my first, to my wife Gail My inspiration, fellow Society member, and a wargamer; To Dr. Joseph Chen, Faculty Oriental History, California State University at Northridge, who introduced me to the history of China, provided translations, and gave me much advice and encouragement in the writing of this book, and to David Court, who spent many hours proofreading my manuscript and who gave this work continuity.
THE ARMIES AND ENEMIES OF ANCIENT CHINA

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INTRODUCTION

This book continues the series on the armies of the ancient world. The intention of this series is to provide background information for students of military and art history, miniature modellers and illustrators.

This particular book is the first known attempt in English to compile a chronological record of the Chinese military systems, with a view to only these systems, segregated from economical–sociological influences. It is not a military history of China, but rather a documented study of the Chinese soldier and his enemies.

In contrast to the previous publications in this series, this is the first book that does not concentrate on the Occidental world. The manuals and histories extant of the west are abundant when compared to those of the Oriental world. As military historians, we are indeed fortunate that, when records were kept, they were very precise and detailed. In addition, the Oriental passion for artistic endeavors provide us with a wealth of frescoes, reliefs, and funerary stelae, many of which are militaristic in theme.

When dealing with the ancient world and its military systems, the military historian should have a secondary discipline, art history. It is in art objects and artifacts that we can see what is merely indicated in literature or historical records. These two disciplines, when utilized side by side, prove invaluable to a researcher of this period and subject.

Another difference between this work and those preceding is the time period covered. We are now dealing with a period of approximately two thousand years. During this period of time, numerous peoples migrate, develop, and expand. I have chosen to concentrate on the Chinese Army development, portraying each of China’s enemies in a somewhat secondary role, only showing their development when they came in contact with China.

An exception to this, of course, is the Mongols. With the rise of the Jenghis Khan, we see the birth of a military system that easily equals in importance anything that China produced.

As the title of this work deals with China, I will document the Mongols only to the point of the Japanese invasions of the late 13th century. As that time, China was already under the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, practically all of Asia was under Mongolian rule, and their eyes turned towards the west and Europe.

As with the rest of the Research Group series, reliance has been placed on ancient authors and excavation reports, with emphasis on monumental and archeological evidence. The ancient authors of this period seldom adequately describe armor types or weapons, therefore archeological evidence is needed. This the Oriental world provides in funerary reliefs and wall paintings. As Art History is my primary academic discipline, I will recognize archeological artifacts or visual evidence as the deciding factor, when the literary evidence and the physical evidence do not coincide.

For students starting a journey into the world of Chinese military history, there are a few volumes that are truly invaluable.

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, translated by S.B. Griffith is an excellent introduction to the Chou Dynasty. In addition to the doctrine included, this edition is by far the most readable and entertaining.

The Shih Chi by Su-ma Ch’ien, (B. Watson, translator) and the History of the Former Han Dynasty by Pan Ku (H. Dubs, translator) provide an excellent start for the Han Dynastic period, along with the multi-volumed works on the Han Administration by M. Loewe.
A very interesting work is *Rome and China* by F.J. Teggart. This describes the interrelationships of two great empires, and how one's actions ultimately affected the other. The great Chinese campaigns against the Hsiung-nu resulted in the barbarian invasions of the west, the creation of the Turks, Tartars, Huns, and Mongols, the destruction of the Indian Empire (via the Kushan), and the fall of Parthia and Persia.

Truly excellent works on the Mongols and their empire are offered by, of course, the primary initial source, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, in two volumes, translated by Colonel Yule; H. Howorth's five volume *History of the Mongols*; and *The Rise of Chinghis Khan and His Conquest of Northern China* by H. Martin provide two additional valuable sources.

I should note that many of the ancient accounts of battles have not been named. I have had to designate names for them to aid in reference. When possible, I have allocated the location of the battle as this name. When this was not possible, a unique occurrence or unusual aspect was used for the name.

The problem of translating a phonetic alphabet to English or any western language adds much to the general confusion. The spelling of any Chinese or Oriental name is subject to the nationality of the translator and the date of writing. An example is the Genghis Khan, spelled alternatively, Jenghis, Chingis, Jingis, Genghiz, and many other ways. For one to state that his version of translation is the only one correct is absurd. Therefore, I have tried to be selective in my spelling and, I hope, consistent.

Finally, let me say that the overall purpose of this work is to generate interest in the peoples of the eastern world. Many unique characteristics have surfaced in my research, but the study of ancient eastern warfare is still in its infancy. If this work can spark any interest or research into this field, then I will consider my efforts as fruitful.


JPG
Los Angeles, California
PRONUNCIATION OF CHINESE NAMES

The following is provided as a guide for the pronunciation of the Chinese names in this book. It is basically a modification of the Wade-Giles system, and I am indebted to Dr. J. Trabold for its use in this work.

Vowel Equivalents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sound</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>as in Father</td>
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<tr>
<td>ai</td>
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Aspirates

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Other Sounds

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<tr>
<td>shih</td>
<td>as in CHivalry</td>
</tr>
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<td>equals hwa or hwo</td>
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<td>as in WHEY</td>
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<td>as in aCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tzu</td>
<td>as in aDZE</td>
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<td>ssū</td>
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE CHINESE DYNASTIES

The Chou Dynasty (1027 – 221 B.C.)

Western Chou
Eastern Chou

“Spring and Autumn Annals”
“The Warring States”

The Ch’in Dynasty (221 – 206 B.C.)

The Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.)

Western Han
Eastern Han

206 B.C. – 23 A.D.
25 – 220 A.D.

The Three Kingdoms and Six Dynasties (Northern and Southern Dynasties) (220 – 589 A.D.)

The Sui Dynasty (589 – 618 A.D.)

The T’ang Dynasty (618 – 906 A.D.)

The Five Dynasties (907 – 960 A.D.)

Chaotic period following collapse of the T’ang
The Liao (Khitan) Dynasty (907 – 1125 A.D.)
Northern China

The Sung Dynasty (960 – 1279 A.D.)
Northern Sung
Southern Sung

The Chin Dynasty (1115 – 1234 A.D.)
Northern China (The Jurchen)

The Yuan Dynasty (1260 – 1368 A.D.)
Mongolian rule
THE CHOU DYNASTY

The periods prior to the advent of the Chou Dynasty (ca. 1027 B.C.) are still shrouded in mystery or in unsubstantiated information. Archaeological finds suggest a great cultural history of the Shang Dynasty (directly preceding the Chou) and possibly indicate an even earlier Hsia Dynasty. It is only when we get to great historians like Su-ma Ch‘ien and his histories that we can stand on fairly firm ground. For this reason this work begins with the Chou.

Exactly when or why the Chou descended from Shansi and Kansu to the Szechuan Plain is not known. It may have been the result of a “domino” movement originating in Western Asia by the Aryans, but according to Chinese tradition this was not so. Until we learn more the Chou will be, as the Shang, still a mystery. Within 20 years the Chou conquered all of the Shang territory, including all 50 states.

During the period of the early (Western) Chou (ca. 1027 — 771 B.C.) a strong central government prevailed. Liege lords paid tribute to the king, and all was relatively stable. In 771 B.C., the Duke of Shên employed Hsiung-nu mercenaries, overthrew the government and killed the king. From this time to the end of the Chou and the unification of the Empire under the Ch‘in, China was reduced to prinicipalities under a feudal system with much power lying in the northern states.

The period of middle (Eastern) Chou, commonly called the Spring and Autumn Annals (ca. 722 — 480 B.C.) saw the life of the great sage K‘ung·fu·tzu (Confucius), the Five Classics, the Book of Tao, the Four Books of Philosophy, and the Sun-tzu (Art of War).

The period of the Warring States (ca. 480 — 221 B.C.) saw the growth of strong states such as Ch‘u in the lower Yangtze Valley, and the dynamic state of Ch‘in in the north and west. The “spartan” Ch‘in state would ultimately put an end to the Chou Dynasty which had, in reality, dissolved in power years before.

ORGANIZATION

The Sun-tzu or Art of War provides much of the Chou military organization and tactics. It is not known who wrote the Art of War or if Sun-tzu were his name. Over the years of Chinese history, we are fortunate that the Sun-tzu was maintained and military critics of later years would add their comments on applications of the Sun-tzu’s principles, “flavoring” their critiques with insights into their own military systems. The Art of War remains today as a classic of military writing.

The principle weapon of the Chou was the quadriga, or four-horse chariot. The infantry served merely to support this main shock weapon. Until rather late in the Chou period, cavalry were sadly neglected as an offensive weapon — — it took the lessons of nomadic warfare to introduce the cavalry arm to the Chinese way of fighting.

The chariot unit, according to the Li-Ki and also Su-ma Fa (ca. 700 B.C.) consisted of the main vehicle, foot soldiers, and attendants. The Li-Ki, as translated by Friedrich Hirth, calls for one three-man war chariot to be supported by 25 armored infantry and 72 unarmored men, thus forming an ancient equivalent to the medieval “lance”, or to Kautilya’s Mauryan Indian “unit” of elephant, chariot, archers and infantry.

Su-ma Fa calls for a “company” of 100; three in the chariot, 72 foot soldiers and 25 attendants with the baggage cart. Obviously, this translation by S. Griffith, is quite different from the Li-Ki. The 25 extra footmen and their duties were mistranslated by one of the authors. Friedrich Hirth is often quoted, but I have found glaring errors in his works, probably due to a misunderstanding of military matters or nomenclature. Therefore, Mr. Griffith may be closer to the correct translation, and the 72 infantry would consist of both armored and unarmored types. It is probable that a very small number of the company would be blessed with any kind of armor whatsoever. In fact, another source suggests that the only armor allocated to these footmen was in the form of a shield.
This doctrine of organization was the norm for many years under the Chou. Regiments and battalions of Guards would be provided for the sovereign and every high-ranking officer or dignitary as a kind of “household” unit. The sovereign would have a Guard of 2,500 infantry, a Shi. Each high-ranking officer would have a 500-man Guard, a Lü. In the later years of the Spring and Autumn Annals period, a more formalized system of Shi and Lü sized units would prevail, with a typical army consisting of six Shi.

The ideal army of the late Chou had 1,000 war chariots; 100,000 infantry (together, these indicate the presence of 1,000 chariot “units”); and an additional 1,000 light chariots. These light chariots would be employed in reconnaissance work, only consisting of driver and bowman.

As in most nations using such a system, it is quite possible that the Chou brigaded chariots, armored infantry and skirmishers into “like” units — perhaps Shi or Lü. At least by the Battle of Ma Ling in 341 B.C. this was the case.

The introduction of massed crossbows at Ma Ling caused the phasing out of chariots from Chinese warfare, as the Sun-tzu states that crossbows were able to put chariots out of business.

**TACTICS**

Clearly, with the chariots being employed as the main shock weapon, little emphasis was placed on the infantry. The liege lords drove the chariots and, when the chariots fell back, the infantry protected them. Striking similarities can be seen to early medieval European practices. Even chivalry took place on the field when opposing chariots fought each other as “codes of conducting warfare” were stringently upheld. The chariots of the Chou were as the medieval knight, the main shock element, while the infantry merely served to support their masters. In the European era, the infantry became the dominant element when armed with a long-range, penetrating weapon — the long bow. In the Chou, the infantry were armed with the deadly crossbow. Both of these weapons, historically, had the same effect: to alter tactical thought and practice of their respective eras.

A few “daring” commanders did use the infantry for more than a supporting role. Wu Ch'i and the Marquis Wen of Wei (ca. 387 B.C.) were such commanders. Infantry were issued long spears, halberds, bows and crossbows, and underwent much training in maneuver and tactics so that they could be used to great effect in battle.

**TRAINING**

Sun-tzu tells us much of the Chinese soldier. It seems that little is mentioned of any training prior to Wu Ch'i and the year 387 B.C.

Under the auspices of Wu Ch'i, training began with regulations regarding the armament of soldiers. Short men were armed with the long spears or halberd; tall men with the bow or crossbow (perhaps to allow for overhead fire?). The strongest carried the banners and flags; and the valiant carried the bells and drums.

Precise movements and orders were beaten out on the drums and signalled by the bells. One beat of the drum signalled “Weapons in Order” (fall in); two meant “Practice Formations” (close order drill); three meant “Mess call”; four was “Prepare for Action”; and five was “Advance”. Ringing of the bells signalled “Halt”.

Drill was taught, and the Chou were able to form square and circular defensive formations; maneuver in line and file; open and close ranks; and extend and close files.

Before closing with the Chou, and going on to the Ch'in and the Han, it must be stressed that a true feeling for Chinese military thought and mode of combat cannot be truly appreciated without a
knowledge of the Sun-tzu. The Art of War was required reading for all generals and many stratagems and dictums stated were frequently used in battle. An example of what is covered in the Sun-tzu is the note in Chapter V, Section 31. It states that to a surrounded enemy you must leave a way of escape— for if the enemy sees that there is no hope of escape, you will change a routed foe into a cornered tiger. Five centuries later, in another part of the world, a certain Julius Caesar will write precisely the same dictum.

Approximate Composition of the Chou Dynasty Army
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

- Untrained, armored infantry = 20%
- Untrained, unarmored infantry = 70%
- Charioteers = 10%, of which half were war chariots
- Unarmored cavalry = 5%
- Crossbow armed infantry = 20%

After 387 B.C., the above could be considered to be trained.
THE CH'IN DYNASTY

The far-eastern equivalent to Greece's Sparta was the state of Ch'in. In a period of great flux under the Chou, the Ch'in were scorned by their Chinese neighbors for lacking culture and emulating their northern barbarian neighbors, the Hsiung-nu. Thus segregated from their Chinese kinsmen, the Ch'in sought to improve themselves and overlooked no opportunity to build their military might and tactical expertise. Discipline in both civil and familial matters ensued, as the government followed the structure of the earlier Shang—creating order where there was chaos.

By 318 B.C., the Ch'in were strong enough to take the Szechuan Plain, the most fertile and productive food-producing area then in China. By 222 B.C., the Ch'in had conquered all rival states and now reigned supreme. This was truly the first time that the Chinese were completely united, for in 238 B.C. all fiefdoms were abolished. Great work was done for the people by the Ch'in ruling house, including a Grand Canal nearly 100 miles long that was cut across Shensi Province to enrich the soil. An irrigation system, reputedly begun in 300 B.C., has banished serious floods in Szechuan for 22 centuries. The people were disarmed, but given property rights for the first time in Chinese history, subject only to taxation. Nobility was no longer a gift of birth, but rather a gift from the state in return for service. Not only was the country unified in purpose and government, but also culturally and administratively. Customs, writing, laws, weights and measures were now uniform by Imperial decree and supervision.

The Emperor Ch'in Shih-huang-ti, in 220 B.C., ordered a network of roads to be built across the Empire. The northern sectional defences were united to form the Great Wall. With all of the assets Shih-huang-ti brought to this first Chinese Empire, he also brought the term tyrant.

Fearing that too many things were "threats" to the Ch'in state and his own power, he gradually degenerated into a despot. Paranoia soon overtook him, and he felt assassination so prevalent a threat that he sought to abolish the chance of it. He ordered all bronze vessels, sculpture, and weapons to be confiscated and destroyed. Many members of the "literati" were executed and much ancient literature was burned, for these could cause his death, or incite others to cause it, or remind the people of another way of life, other than that dictated by the state. The only books to survive the burnings were those on medicine, divination, farming, arboriculture and his own geneology.

This "intellectual purge" was coupled with a breakdown of morality and the military system. Soon the Empire was being drained of all it's resources just to supply Shih-huang-ti's regime. But this supply did not satiate the despot's desires. Sadness and poverty soon grew into rebellion and disorder. It was time for a change.

THE CH'IN ARMY

The primary importance of the Ch'in military system lay not in any great administrative or organizational difference. It lies in the type of force employed. In the Chou period, reliance was placed or the chariot and infantry, to the derogation of the cavalry arm.

By 320 B.C., Wu Ling, the Duke of Chao (located just due east of the early state of Ch'in and bordering the Hsiung-nu) adopted the use of cavalry for his army, copying closely the Hsiung-nu system.

The Ch'in duplicated this system, and soon unarmored horse archers swarmed over the slower chariots and infantry of the Chou armies. The division of the separate Chou states allowed the Ch'in to defeat each state individually, and the Chou "nation", in detail.

Approximate Composition of the Ch'in Dynasty Army

Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored cavalry, horse archers</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charioteers</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossbow-armed infantry</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored and unarmored infantry</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE HAN DYNASTY

The anarchy that followed the fall of the Ch'in was complete. The various provinces fell to the army commanders, as a “free-for-all” threw the unified Empire back into chaos.

Liu Pang, an adventurer of sorts, while serving as a police official in Kiangsu province, carved out a personal kingdom in a rather novel way. Finding himself as the escort for a body of condemned prisoners, he decided to remove their chains and form a regiment of brigands. Naturally, they were delighted at the prospect, and eagerly followed their new-found “condottiere” captain, Liu Pang. Liu Pang then anointed the drums with his blood, and adopted blood red as the color for his standards. At the head of his “brigand band” he proceeded to carve out a kingdom in Kiangsu. In 207 B.C., he marched on Shensi and took it by popularity, not force—a kind of “Anschluss”. For five years, Liu Pang fought his rival, Hsiang Yu, and finally defeated him in 202 B.C. This commoner’s son, the leader of an army of convicts, was now the unchallenged Emperor of China. This Empire, the Han (named after the Han River and Liu Pang’s Imperial name, Han Kao-tzu) was to last until 220 A.D., and leave such a mark on China and her history that even today the Chinese refer to themselves as “The Sons of Han”.

ORGANIZATION

The Han were masters at administration and this is reflected in their army organizations. Michael Loewe’s work on the Chü-yen bamboo strips has brought to light much detail on the Han chain of command and unit organization.

Field army commanders, the Shang Chun or Ta Chun, were at the head of the army organization, responsible only to the Emperor. They might also command the military regions or provinces.

At the head of a particular army was the commanding officer, the Chiang Chun, or general. The army was then brigaded into physical “areas” and commanded by generals of lower rank. The front or vanguard, commanded by the Chi’en Chun, was supported by the left wing, commanded by the Tao Chun, and the right wing, commanded by the Yu Chun. The rear was brought up by the Hou Chun.

These were aided in administrative duties by the Lieh Chun, or general staff. Colonels (Hsiao wei) were not included in a “normal” chain of command as we know today, but rather seem to have been administrative officials and not necessarily military commanders.

According to the Chü-yen strips, three Tu-wei-fu or battalions, were allocated to a Chun, or army.

The Tu-wei-fu was the basic unit in the Han organization. This unit was composed of local troops (provincial units), local cavalry, but mainly of conscripted infantry. It was commanded by a Tu-wei, assisted by a Ch’eng and a Ssu-ma. This Tu-wei-fu would consist of any number of Hou-kuan, or companies, each of which was commanded by a Hou. In turn, each Hou-kuan was composed of from four to six platoons, or Hou. Each platoon was commanded by a Hou-chang, and consisted of six to seven squads or Sui. These squads were commanded by a Sui-chang, and usually consisted of up to eleven men.

Within the army, the best fighter of every Sui was transferred to a special unit, the shock or elite troops. This theoretically would be ten percent, or one in ten. Mainly held as a reserve, in Han times they were called the “Gallants from the Three Rivers”.

Cavalry were detached directly from army headquarters to Tu-wei-fu, Hou-kuan, or Hou headquarters. They may have followed standard army organization, but this is not known for sure. A documented unit of unknown type had 182 men.

The Han made much use of allied auxiliary cavalry units—the majority of which were usually border tribes of the Hsiung-nu.
Prisoners and convicts were frequently used in the army, in two capacities. The common labor troops were convicts merely serving out a prison sentence. They performed the menial tasks around the camps, dug ditches and latrines, built fortifications and the like, and, much to their chagrin, served as "cannon fodder" in battle. However, the Chi'ih-hsing were amnestied convicts, serving out their sentence in the combat arm of the army. These frequently were very fierce fighters, not hampered with too much military training.

Pioneers were not engineers or the like, as we might call them today. They were the static garrisons that manned the Chinese limes and the Great Wall. These troops were mainly armed farmers, and actually cultivated the areas around their posts when not on duty, much like their 4th and 5th century Roman counterparts.

In addition to the above, there were several specialized units in the Han Army, brought to light by Chao Ch'ung-huo's campaign against the rebellious Western Ch'iang in 61 B.C. It is here that we first hear of the "Volunteer Expert Marksman", who distinguished themselves by their uncanny marksmanship. These operated as a jäger or Rifle Brigade-type in battle, but as to whether they were armed with a bow or crossbow the histories do not tell us. The "Winged Forest Orphans" were an elite body of armored infantry, all of whom were orphaned as a direct result of their fathers' dying in battle. The "Liang Chia-tzu" were elite noble-born cavalymen, and more than likely, armored. Finally, the "Yung-kan" archers are mentioned but not elaborated upon.

The Han were noted for their use of artillery and long-ranged crossbows. These weapons clearly gave them an advantage as they generally out-ranged any weapons their enemies possessed.

TACTICS
As is evident in the battle narratives of the Han period, not much in the way of stratagems and innovations were ignored by Han generals. They learned much from Sun-tzu and applied his principles well.

Basically, much attention was focused on the missile weapon as the main arm, and the crossbow simply out-classed any opponent's weapon. On repeated occasions (Battle of Sogdiana, 38 B.C., Li Ling, 90 B.C., for examples) the crossbows were formed up in ranks protected by the armored infantry who carried large shields and long spears. Even the armored cavalry at times were equipped with these crossbows, forming a kind of "self-propelled artillery".

The chariots were used for the final blow, after the bows had done the real work. Cavalry was used for the shock assault if the ground wasn't suitable for the chariots. Generally, the cavalry arm was used in two ways— one, as a reconnaissance and pursuit force, and two, if a highly mobile force such as the Hsiung-nu were involved as an enemy in battle, the Han cavalry attempted to pin the enemy cavalry, allowing the infantry and chariots to close.

TRAINING
In this category, the Han Army was far superior to any previous Chinese Army and most of her enemies.

During the early Han, all males between the ages of 23 and 56 were conscripted for two years active service. During the years 155-74 B.C., the age was reduced to 20 for conscription. At the age of 56, all low ranking infantry and marines were classed as "elderly and decrepit" and were "made civilians".

Training was not left in boot camp either. Every year, on the eighth month, the entire army, no ranks or arms excepted, was involved in a General Inspection and testing program. All units were graded on
performance, and woe to the unit commander whose unit was not up to par! Thus, training and combat proficiency were a constant and ongoing operation during the Han period.

**Approximate Composition of the Han Dynasty Army**

Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

- Armored cavalry = 50%
- Unarmored or lightly armored cavalry = 50%
- Tribal auxiliary unarmored cavalry = 50%
- Labor troops = 10%
- Convict Combat troops = 10%
- Armored infantry = 50%
- Unarmored infantry = 50%

Of the last two categories, 30% could be armed with the crossbow

- Artillerists = 10%
- Charioteers = 5% scout, 5% war chariots
THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DYNASTIES

Stability, or rather relative stability, was the order of the day for three hundred years under the Han. During this time, the minor princes sometimes rebelled, but the disruption was quelled quickly. Dissent was not allowed to fester. By the end of the 3rd century A.D., however, the situation was different. The increasing discontent erupted into an uncontrollable virus that destroyed the central government and the House of Han.

The three kingdoms that followed the collapse of the Han: the Wei in the north, the Shu in the west, and the Wu in the east neatly divided China into three equal areas. The Wei managed to defeat the other two kingdoms by 280 A.D., and this Empire, the Tsin, lasted more or less until 420 A.D.

The Tsin attempted to goad the Tu Chueh and Hsiung-nu tribes into fighting each other, and, for a while, this succeeded. Unfortunately, the Chinese court lapsed once again into corruption and deauchery resulting in a country racked with thieves, drought, famine, pestilence and floods. The armies again degenerated, in direct contrast to their enemy’s.

From the period of about 304 A.D. to 386, the Turkic, Tibetan, Hsiung-nu, and Mongolian hordes ravaged China, the Chinese overthrew these barbarians, and were ravaged again. In 386 A.D., the Northern Wei Dynasty (founded by the T'ou-pa Turks) occupying Shansi province, held on to their conquered territory, and soon the Chinese were forced to flee south of the Yangtze River.

With the final overthrow of the Eastern Tsin in south China (ca. 420 A.D.) China was virtually horizontally split in two. Chinese rule was limited to southern China. The southern Chinese still could not stabilize, as dynasties followed dynasties. The Liu (Sung) (420–479) was followed by the Ch'i (479–502), the Liang (502–557), and the Ch'en (557–589), and all was not stagnant in the Turkic north.

In 535, the Wei split into east and west factions, and were succeeded by the Northern Ch'i (550–577), the Northern Chou (557–581), and the Later Liang (555–587).

The unification of China occurred again in 590 A.D., this time by Yang Chien. A minor official of the Later Liang, he challenged and slew, one after another, 60 princes of the blood, and dethroned the last Liang Emperor in 587 A.D. In 589, his armies conquered the Ch'en. All of China was once again united, this time under the Sui.

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DYNASTIC ARMIES

During this period, the fluctuating dynasties and petty kingdoms prohibited any large army. At the beginning of this period, much of the Han organization was maintained. For example, the elite shock troops of the Wu Kingdom were called “Dissolvers of Difficulty”, and those of the Ch'i were called “Fate Deciders”—a tradition continued from the Chou, to the Han, and now to the Three Kingdoms.

Due to the nature of the upheavals, much use of Turkic mercenaries ensued, with a de-emphasis on the chariot. Heavier cavalry including cataphracts developed, partly due to the Tu Chueh influence. During the period of the Turkic Wei rule, organizations that the Tu Chueh employed would be used. Generally, heavier infantry and cavalry followed the collapse of the Han, with an emphasis on quantity and not quality.

Approximate Composition of the Northern and Southern Dynastic Armies

Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored, untrained cavalry</td>
<td>= 60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored, untrained infantry</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored, untrained cavalry</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored, untrained infantry</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained units</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Southern:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored, poorly trained cavalry</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely armored (cataphract) trained cavalry</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored, poorly trained cavalry</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored, poorly trained infantry</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored, poorly trained infantry</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the last two categories, 10% could be armed with crossbow.

Artillerists = 5%
After three and a half centuries of disunion, the Sui Dynasty finally succeeded in uniting China once again. But at the turn of the 7th century A.D., China was once again plunged into turmoil. Unrestrained Imperial luxury and widespread governmental corruption led the Empire into open revolt. It just doesn't seem that the pampered Chinese nobility ever learn.

The “King Arthur” of the time was Li Shih-min (later to become the T'ang Emperor T'ang T'ai Tsung), who, after conquering every other contestant, founded the T'ang Dynasty in 618 A.D. Under this dynasty China was to extend her Empire to further limits than any other dynasty, even the Han. Trade was exhalted to a height never before known. A never-ending stream of caravans traversed the silk route, carrying Chinese exports throughout the known world. By 733 A.D., the Imperial Census reported 43,000,000 people living within the T'ang Empire.

**ORGANIZATION**

The organization of the T'ang Army began with the six field armies Chün. These were divided into two wings each, the left (senior), and the right, each consisting of three armies. Each wing was commanded by a general, the left wing commander being senior. A Chief of Staff and a cavalry commander (Ssu-ma) completed the army's command positions.

The army was divided into infantry regiments responsible directly to army headquarters, while cavalry regiments were brigaded into divisions subordinate to army headquarters. Infantry organization ca. 744 A.D. allowed for regiments of 800–1200 men. The main body of infantry, the Militia, had some 600 regiments.

The cavalry were grouped in 4,000 man divisions and regiments of 500 and 1,000 men. Squadrons of 200 and 300 men have been identified as independent squadrons, not subordinate to a regiment, but rather subordinate directly to army command.

The Imperial Guard provided twelve regiments, six cavalry and six infantry to guard the Emperor, and three of each to protect the Crown Prince.

In addition to the above “regular” units, the T'ang made much use of allied auxiliaries. In 617 A.D., the Western Tu' Chuheh (the T'ai-nai tribes) were allied with Li Shih-min in his bid for power with the Sui Chinese. During the period 630–682 A.D., the Eastern Tu' Chuheh allied with the T'ang to fight the Western Tu' Chuheh and the Kuchan. In 644, the Uighur Tu' Chuheh also allied to fight the Kuchan, and in 649, 1,200 Tibetan armored cavalry and 7,000 Nepalese infantry were called in to fight King Alanashan of India at Chapra on the Ganges River.

In 617 A.D., command organization for the State of T'ang was as follows. As is obvious, the organization will remain the same into the Empire, with the exception of positional changes.

- **Generalissimo** = The Duke of T'ang
- **Left Wing (Senior)** = The Duke of Lung-hsi, Li Chien-ch'eng
- **Right Wing** = The Duke of Tun-huang, Li Shih-min
- **Chief of Staff** = Pei Chi
- **Cavalry Commander (Ssu-ma)** = Liu Wên-ching

There were several units that distinguished themselves during the T'ang period. One was Li Shih-min’s bodyguard of 100 armored cavalry, other units were the “Flying Horse” unarmored cavalry, and the “Yu-men” squadron of 300 armored cavalry lancers. The last two units were probably independent formations.
Seige artillery for the T'ang included numerous large catapults, and large “multiple crossbows” (similar to ballistae?), capable of discharging eight bolts in repeating fire at a range of 500 paces.

TRAINING
The bulk of the early T'ang infantry and even the cavalry were conscripted. The cavalry were all considered elite when compared to the infantry. Because of this cavalry-oriented philosophy, the infantry of the T'ang seldom ever left the farmer-soldier status. It was the heavy cavalry that won Li Shih-min’s great victories such as that at Ssu-shui in 620 A.D. The discipline, esprit de corps, and tactical expertise of these units provided the ferocity in battle that could annihilate a far superior force. Indicative of the degree of training and indoctrination, the elite shock troops of the T'ang were called “Leapers and Agitators”.

Once the campaigns started to be lost, disintegration quickly followed both in training and administration. The numerous rebellions of the 9th century broke the back of the army, and the Chinese looked to their farmer-soldiers for support that never materialized.

TACTICS
Against nomadic tribes, the T'ang sought to capture their flocks and occupy their wells rather than to fight or to pursue a much faster foe across the Steppes. The T'ang also set out to disrupt their foes via diplomatic means. By setting one tribe against another, a fighting force could lose all cohesiveness and crumble before the slightest Chinese opposition. When Qadir Khan, in 622 A.D., entered China with a force of 150,000 T'u Chueh, the Chinese managed to subdue this massive army piecemeal (see T'u Chueh).

The T'ang favoured pinning down an enemy frontally, then working their way around the enemy’s flanks. This was used against the Koreans, who had little if any heavy cavalry as a mobile reserve with which they could counter this move.

Of course, the T'ang were not above any deed if it would ensure victory, or even the chance of it, as may be seen in the unorthodox method of disrupting an enemy described in the narrative, “The Battle of Kansu”.

As a general, Li Shih-min ranks with the all-time greats. He used the stratagem of displaying more standards that units in his army to imply more units than were actually present. Also, when confronted with impossible odds as at Ssu-Shui, he was not above splitting his force, leading a tiny squadron out of position and confusing and demoralizing him, and then lashing out with a highly trained and motivated army on his terms.

Hannibal’s trek across the Alps was equalled under the T'ang by General Kao Hsien-chin, who, in 747 A.D., took a 10,000 man cavalry army and advanced over a wilderness area, across the Pamir Mountain range at Baroghil (elevation 12,400’) and the Glacier Darkhot (elevation 15,400’) descending finally into the Yasin Valley, there defeating a Tibetan-Arabic allied army, after a gruelling journey of over 700 miles!

Approximate Composition of the T'ang Dynasty Army
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed before 885 A.D.

- Chinese trained, armored cavalry = 50%, of these, 10% were elite
- Chinese trained, unarmored cavalry = 20%
- Chinese conscripted, poorly trained spearmen and bowmen = 50%
- Chinese Guard or trained armored infantry = 10%
Tribal auxiliary unarmored cavalry, armored cavalry, or skirmishers = 30%

In 885 A.D., the army degenerated into regiments of 1,000 men. The army theoretically had 54 of these. The cavalry fell into disuse, and poorly trained armored infantry constituted the bulk of the later T'ang Army. This was the case until the Empire’s fall.
THE SUNDYNASTY

Even with the great prosperity of the Tang, disaster and collapse lurked behind the Imperial throne. As was the case in the past is now true also: the government needed or desired more funds. For many centuries, the peasants had borne the chief burden when it came to taxation. An attempt was made in 766 A.D. and 780, to transfer part of this burden to the wealthier landowners. But, as this was administered by local officials and rampant corruption ensued, this “remedy” failed.

Internal discontent, corruption of high officials and general disillusion finally brought the government of the Tang to an end. As was generally the case, political chaos followed the dissolution of the Tang.

Between 907 and 1125 A.D., the Khitan horde overran northern China and established the Liao Empire. Absolute anarchy and chaos prevailed throughout the remainder of China, as bandits pillaged and sacked, back and forth, over the southlands.

The inclusive dates of approximately 800-960 A.D. are known to the Chinese historians as the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Independent States, which explains rather succinctly, the state of affairs over this period of time.

When the last “emperor” of the southern confusion died in 959 A.D., Chao K’uang-yin became regent of the largest principality in this chaotic “nation”. After a brief, successful campaign against the Khitan in the north, by 979 A.D., China was once again united, with the exception of the northernmost kingdoms, the Khitan (Liao) and the Hsi-Hsia (due west of the Liao).

From 960-1279 A.D., this Empire, the Sung, prevailed. This precarious empire managed to hold out for all of these years with many threatening enemies virtually ringing them. To the north were the Khitan (Liao), the Jurchen (Chin) after 1125 and until 1234, and then the Mongols. The Tangut Tibetans in the west menaced the Sung border, while the southern flank was threatened by the Annam and Nan Chao kingdoms.

In 1127, the Jurchen threw the Sung boundaries to south of the Yangtze River. This Empire, now termed the Southern Sung, enjoyed existence until they violated Mongolian territory in an attempt to break out. This gambit resulted in the Mongolian campaign against the Sung, that commenced in 1273 and lasted but six years, terminating in the total destruction of the Sung. The following rule was Mongol, termed the Yuan Dynasty, that lasted until 1368 A.D., when the Ming Dynasty seized power away from the weakened Mongols—the Chinese were once again in power.

ORGANIZATION

According to Chang Yü, a military critic and commentator of the Sun-tzu during the Sung era, the Sung had a high degree of military organization. Five men constituted a squad; two squads, a section; five sections, a platoon; two platoons, a company; two companies, a battalion; two battalions, a regiment; two regiments, a group; two groups, a brigade; and two brigades, an army. Therefore, an “army” would consist of, at paper strength, 3,200 men.

At the beginning of the Sung period, there were three distinct divisions within the army: the Imperial Guards, the Militia, and the Labor Corps. A professional, standing army of 200,000 was maintained for the first 80 years of the empire, whereafter it grew to 1,400,000. However, the larger the army grew, due to insufficient training and equipment, the weaker it became.

In 1050 A.D., Shen Tsung attempted to reestablish a well-trained, small professional army, backed up by a vast militia. His organization called for units of 10, 50 and 500. This is the type of army organization that prevailed until the final collapse in 1279.
TACTICS
In the Sung period, much reliance was placed on the infantry, supported by artillery. Cavalry, although highly regarded, was simply not available to the Sung, as they had lost their horse-breeding areas to the Tartars. The Chinese use of natural barriers such as rivers and rice paddies, coupled with an astute knowledge of fortifications and siege warfare, left them a near inaccessible foe, hardly worth the trouble to attack.

Rockets and fire catapults had been known for quite a few years. If not in common use prior to this period, the Sung made much use of them in both field and siege warfare. The Sung used rockets against the Mongols and the Khitan (Liao). When Sung China fell, the Mongols “drafted” many Chinese artillerists into their armies. Thereafter, all of the Mongol’s enemies “benefited” from Chinese military technology.

Approximate Composition of the Sung Dynasty Army
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored cavalry</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored cavalry</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored infantry</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored infantry</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillerists</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE HSIUNG-NU

"The Hsiung-nu move on the feet of swift horses, and in their breasts beat the hearts of beasts. They shift from place to place as swiftly as a flock of birds, so that it is extremely difficult to corner them and bring them under control... It would not be expedient to attack the Hsiung-nu. Better to make peace with them."

Han An-kuo, Minister to the Han Emperor Ching

Hereditary enemies of the Chinese, the Hsiung-nu harassed, defeated, and were defeated by, the Chinese time after time.

As is common with the Steppe cultures, the Hsiung-nu were a confederation of tribes, the number and specific tribes varying. It should be noted that several historians have differing opinions over the beginnings and ultimate displacements of these tribes. The term "Hun" is used generically for these people, as is "Tartar". The Chinese historians add to our consternation by referring, at times, to anyone north or northwest of their border as the Hsiung-nu. Hsiung-nu is, after all, a Chinese name. The suffix "nu" incidentally, is a characteristically derogatory term for these people. It means "slave".

It is generally agreed that the Yuëh-chih, were a western border "horde" of the Hsiung-nu, although consistently were at odds with them. The Wu-sun tribe of this "horde" were notable due to their complexion, which was fair-haired and blue-eyed (see Tokharians) and also because they were frequently allied with the Chinese and at odds with their kinsmen.

With all of these tribes allied, neutral and enemy, it is no wonder that a leader such as Mao-dun (ca. 209-174 B.C.) was of such importance.

He is the first known leader to unite the Hsiung-nu under one banner into a cohesive fighting nation. From this time on, the incessant Hsiung-nu and Tu Chueh pressures will force Chinese intervention and elaborate defences against this threat. The major breath of the Great Wall was constructed on the Hsiung-nu border.

ORGANIZATION

In the early days of the Hsiung-nu, before the introduction of the cavalry arm, tribes such as the Ti and Rung were composed entirely of poorly armed infantry. To the time of the great leader Mao-dun, we know little of any organizational or administrative details.

When Mao-dun consolidated the tribes of the Hun-yü, Chü-she, Ting-ling, Ko-k'ün and the Hsin-li, into the confederated Hsiung-nu, a strict decimal organization was instituted.

The leader of the Hsiung-nu was called a Shan-yü. The confederation was divided into "left" and "right" (east and west?) provinces, each commanded by a Tu-ch'ì. The "left" (west?) province commander was the heir presumptive, following the Hsiung-nu principle of assigning the left as point of honor and rank.

Each of these Tu-ch'ì had, as subordinates, a left and right Ku-li. Army commanders subordinate to these were called Tang-ku. This organization changed little from the time of it's inception, to the take-over by the Mongols.
Unlike most Steppe cultures, the Hsiung-nu leaders did not always follow along hereditary lines. These leaders were, for the most part, chosen by a vote of the tribal chiefs.

Although fast moving cavalry was the main arm of the Hsiung-nu Army right into the European contacts with the Huns, some infantry were, at times employed. This can be documented in at least the period of 36 B.C. to 73 A.D.

In 73 A.D., the infantry were organized into 300 man units

**TACTICS**

The Hsiung-nu learned most of their tactics and horsemanship from the Indo-Aryans, the Bactrians, Scythians and hereditary predecessors, whomever they may have been. This is the generally stated theory of the Hsiung-nu and their development. It is still a mystery as to who exactly and when, introduced the cavalry way of fighting to the Hsiung-nu. What is known, is that the progression of cavalry fighting went from Middle Asia and travelled east. The Chinese only started to raise cavalry units after many defeats by the hands of the fast moving Hsiung-nu.

The bow, javelin and shield were primary weapons as the “hordes” struck fast and hard, only to disappear in an instant.

Raids were superstitiously only planned during the cycle of the waxing moon. The waning moon always would recall raids and the Hsiung-nu would remain dormant during these times. Naturally, it didn’t take the Chinese long to figure out this recurrent cycle and use it to their advantage.

Time after time, the Hsiung-nu used another stratagem that almost invariably worked. In fact, it worked so well, that many other eastern nations copied this tactic, including the learned Chinese!

Picked units, renowned for their tenacity, would engage the very centre of the enemy line. Putting up a savage fight, on signal, they would feign defeat, and flee in “abject terror”. The speed by which these “routed” troops fled would outdistance most pursuers. Now, thinking that the cream of the Hsiung-nu were now put to rout, the enemy would chase them— to put an end to the entire Army!

Lurking on the flanks of these “routing” troops were the Hsiung-nu reserves. On signal, the “routing” troops turned around, and recharged the enemy, with the reserves hitting the bewildered pursuer’s flanks, and enveloping the enemy.

**Approximate Composition of the Hsiung-nu Army**

Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Light Infantry or leather armored infantry</th>
<th>Light Cavalry</th>
<th>Light or leather armored infantry as skirmishers or battle-line troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ca. 700–350 B.C.</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>no more than 5%</td>
<td>up to 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350 B.C. and on</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the Chinese historians, the Kushan were relatives of the Yüeh-chi, a barbarian tribe of the west. They were also the Wu-sun, displaced to the south. The ancient name of this tribe, again conjecturally, is the “Tukhara”. If these are the “Tokharoi” of Greek record (when Alexander’s men were in Bactria), then we have them pinned down. For these are also of record, known as the Yüeh-Chih, an Indo-scythic people, from the area of Bactria. And this completes the circle, as it concurs with the ancient Chinese historians.

Much about the Kushan is shrouded in mystery. Or rather, I should say, confusion. The major problem existing today, with regards to the Kushan, is the dating system used to chronicle the reigns of the early Kushan Kings. In fact, it is so much a problem, that Chinese dates become confused every time in their history they came in contact with the Kushan!

The extent of the Kushan Empire would, at it’s height, encompass Afghanistan, Turkestan, Bukhara and parts of Russian Turkestan.

The only contact Kushan India had with China, is related in the Battle Narrative section, “Pan Ch’ao’s Victory Over the Kushans”.

**ORGANIZATION**

It is known that the Kushan utilized many Scythic tactics (which is not unusual, considering that they are of the same ancestral stock) therefore, we can assume that basically those two armies were not very dissimilar.

Unarmored cavalry would dominate, there would be a proportion of armored cavalry to support the “lights”, and a number of Bactrian camels.

A coin minted by the first Kushan King, Kujula Kadphises, portrays a Bactrian camel on the obverse side of the coin. This reflects their heritage, ancestral lands and common beast of burden.

After the northern Indian subjugation by the Kushan, which is prior to the Chinese contact, we could expect a number of native Indian infantry, cavalry, chariotry and elephants to join the Kushan army as auxiliaries.

Kushan organization was, like most of the Steppe cultures, and the eastern nations, decimal.

We know that chariotry was still taught under the reign of Kaniska (ca. 144 A.D.) so we can assume that chariotry played some part in the Kushan army, if perhaps only to ferry officers around.

**Approximate Composition of the Kushan Army**

Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored cavalry</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored cavalry</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored cameltry</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored skirmishers</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored infantry</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charioteers</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elephant riders</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BACTRIA, FERGHANA, AND SOGDIANA:

These three principalities occupied the region of Central Asia presently represented by upper Sinkiang Province and Russian Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kirghiz, and eastern Kazakh. Situated north and west of the Tarim River Basin, these kingdoms connected the west with the east geographically and culturally.

It is a recurring coincidence that the Bactrian and Sogdian people were recorded by Chinese historians as having reddish hair and green eyes. The similarities to the Kushan and Tokharian people surely - perhaps the Aryan invasions?

Important not only for its strategic location between east and west, these areas also were rich producers of ores and horses - both of which were necessary for the nomads and Chinese alike. In later times, with the arrival of the silk caravans and the famous “silk route”, these areas greatly advanced in importance. The most direct route to the Mediterranean from China was straight through the Tarim Basin and these kingdoms.

The importance levied on Sogdiana (Kang-gü) can be seen in regards to Chih-chih’s interference in the narrative “Battle of Sogdiana”.

The Ferghanian horses so sought after by all eastern peoples were the reason for two Chinese campaigns under the Han — both of which were successful. In both 102 B.C. and 103 A.D., the Chinese defeated these small kingdoms and drew many horses from these lands to stock Chinese stables.

As the years progressed and Chinese rule left these areas, the Hsiung-nu, T’u Chueh, and other nomadic tribes moved in and established these horse-breeding areas for their own use.

THE CENTRAL ASIAN ARMIES:

Possibly inheriting their sense of tactics and mode of warfare from the Aryans, the early Bactrians (and their Scythic ancestors) utilized war chariots and cavalry to a maximum. Camelry (the Bactrian camel) was also developed to support the mounted armies of this area. Alexandrian Hellenistic influence is shown in Bactrian reliefs in Persepolis, but amazingly little in the way of Occidental warfare rubbed off on the province.

The common ties with the nomadic tribes developed the decimal system of military organization. This system remains constant in the Steppes of Asia virtually throughout the periods covered in this book.

The horse archer, the main element of each of these kingdom’s armies, developed into the well-trained and mobile Hunnic armies. The Scyths developed the tactic of firing volley after volley of arrows into an enemy, feigning defeat and goading him into rash pursuit only to be smashed by a fresh reserve. This stratagem was handed down to their successors and continued throughout Asian warfare.

Approximate Composition of the Central Asian Armies:

Bactrian and Sogdian Armies:

Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored horse archers</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charioteers</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored cameleers</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Ferghanan Armies:**
Maximum percentages of types with the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored horse archers</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored cameleers</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE KOREANS

The Chinese have had a colonial interest in Korea since 346 B.C. when they first established dominance in that area. This dominance however, should not be misconstrued. The Koreans have always had a strong national spirit, and China's history of "occupation" and wars with the Koreans, call them "mop-up operations", or "police actions" or whatever, would fill a volume in itself.

Forced to send conscripted infantry to fight the Hsiung-nu, as well may be expected, these fought with something less than vigor.

Uproars begun in the 4th–6th centuries A.D., erupted into total war by the 7th century. According to Chinese historians, the Army assembled against the Chinese at An Shih Ch'e was composed of over 200,000 men. This rebellion was quelled by the great Li Shih-min.

The Liao (Khitan) dominance followed, subsequently by the Jurchen. From 1218 A.D. to it’s end in 1232 when the King was forced to flee to Kanghwa island, the Koreans vainly fought the Mongols.

With the Mongol defeat, the Koreans were no better off than when they were occupied by the Chinese. Relocated to a mere "recruitment pool" of warm bodies, more than 21,000 Koreans served in the Mongolian Army as auxiliaries, and very few ever returned. These souls were employed as the main assault element in both of the ill-fated and mismanaged Japanese Invasions.

ORGANIZATION

In 997 B.C., Ch'un, son of the "immortal" Kija, organized his 7,300 man Army into 59 "regiments" of about 123 or 124 men each.

By 346 B.C., the army had grown to 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, but unit organizations are not known.

The 4th–7th centuries A.D., saw infantry as still the main arm, but the introduction of more bow armed light cavalry and some cataphracts.

It is in the period of the wars with the Mongols that we have much information on Korean organization.

The Chinju commanded the Army, with a 1,000 man infantry unit commanded by a Toryong, and a similar cavalry unit by a Singiyong.

Unit complements were normally 1,000, 100, and 50 men. The Guard units, "Tobang", were of 500 men each. A cavalry unit of 1,000 men was called a "Singi", and a similarly sized unit of crossbowmen was called a "Taegak".

Three 100 man units out of every 1,000 man unit, were "shock" or "elite" units.

The cataphracts found in Figure 64, may constitute one such unit (elite) in a heavy cavalry unit, or may constitute the Guard Cavalry. There is a problem here, however, as Chinese histories repeatedly blame the Korean defeats on their consistent lack of heavy cavalry.

An unusual group that may constitute a type of Guard unit, was the "Maesang". The only information available on these, is that they adorned their shields with designs of "strange beasts".

The Invasion Armies under Mongol Administration consisted of infantry, both armored and unarmored, and equivalent cavalry types. The three "waves" or Armies had 6,000, then 5,000 and finally, 10,000 men in them. These were probably organized after their Mongol master's units.
TACTICS
Unfortunately, little can be said here. The only battle narrative that has any embellishment whatever, simply implies that the infantry formed the center (possibly leather armored, shield and spear armed) with missile troops supporting on the flanks and rear ranks. The light cavalry served as a mobile reserve.

Approximate Composition of the Korean Army
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

Prior to 346 B.C.:  
- Lightly armored infantry skirmishers = 100%  
- Light Cavalry = 5%

346 B.C. – ca. 300 A.D.:  
- Lightly armored and unarmored archers or spear bearers = 90%  
- Light Cavalry Horse archers = 10%

c. 300 A.D. – ca. 1200 A.D.:  
- Lightly armored infantry skirmishers and unarmored archers = 80%  
- Unarmored crossbowmen = 10%  
- Light cavalry horse archers = 15%  
- Armored cavalry and Cataphracts combined = 10%

ca. 1200 – 1232 A.D.:  
- Lightly armored skirmishers and unarmored archers = 60%  
- Unarmored crossbowmen = 20%  
- Guardsmen = 10%  
- Light cavalry horse archers = 20%  
- Armored cavalry and Cataphracts combined = 20%

Mongol Domination:  
- Armored infantry = 10%  
- Lightly and unarmored skirmishers and archers = 80%  
- Light Cavalry horse archers = 50%  
- Armored Cavalry, some with partially armored horses = 20%
THE T'U CHUEH

As with the Hsiung-nu, modern historians disagree on these people's history.

The traditional Chinese account says that the T'u Chueh (who are generically called "turks") are descended from a tribe of the Hsiung-nu who were forced to flee west after being defeated by another Hsiung-nu horde. This tribe in question, then migrated to the Altai Mountain range district and settled around a large, "helmet" shaped hill. This area was extremely rich in iron-ore deposits, and the "turks" soon became quite adept at ironwork. Their ironwork and the shape of the dominant geographical feature of the area led to their name, for T'u Chueh or "Turk", in differing languages, means "helmet". In 545 A.D., Tumen Khan forced these groups to separate into east and west branches. The Eastern T'u Chueh occupied an area stretching into the Gobi Desert, the Western stemming into Central Asia, later to become the Ottoman Turks. A sub-branch, the T'u-yü-huns occupied northeastern Tibet.

I would draw the reader to the narrative of The Battle of Sogdiana. In about 38 B.C., Chih-chih's tribe drives off the Wu-sun, as the beginning of his ill-fated quest for power. As the Wu-sun were at the time, situated northeast of Sogdiana— it will be seen that just south and a little west will be found the Altai Mountain range.

The Wu-sun were known to be a fair-haired and blue/green eyed people— foreign complexions to the Hsiung-nu.

The T'o-pa Turks of the Eastern T'u Chueh, the dominant tribe of the branch, had a succession of yellow-bearded Kings.

Just perhaps, Chih-chih's actions had an ultimate detrimental effect on his sworn enemy, the Chinese. For, in about three or four hundred years after Chih-chih's death, the Chinese Dynasties fall to the T'o-pa Turks, and the Wei Dynasty, a non-Chinese Dynasty begins.

It is my own hypothesis, but perhaps Chih-chih's drive on the Wu-sun ultimately made the Wu-sun the forebearers of the T'u Chueh.

ORGANIZATION
The earliest organization found for the T'o-pa T'u Chueh is ca. 540 A.D. This is specifically for the Tabgatch horde, but other tribes in and around the area would also follow this organization, as part of the T'o-pa.

The titular Khan or the equivalent, possibly even Shan-yü denotes the overall commander. Units were organized in strict decimal progressions. A commander of 10,000 was a Yabghu; of 1,000, a Shad; of 100, a Tekin; and of 10, a Tudun.

The bodyguard of the leader was called "Fu-li", or "wolf". The Western T'u Chueh had a 200 man bodyguard for their leader.

These units, although composed largely of heavily armored cavalry, unarmored light cavalry and camelry, seem to have been poorly disciplined, ill-trained and rather inept. In an encounter in 622 A.D., against the T'ang Chinese, the Qadir Khan, leading an Army of 150,000 in 10,000 man divisions, suffered 5,000 casualties in a battle and the entire Army went into rout due to the incident. These casualties represent but 3.3% of the total Army strength.

A partial answer to this lies in the fact that seldom were all tribes loyal to their own Branch, and seldom were Branches loyal to each other. T'ang China was particularly adept at diplomatic endeavors,
as, from the period 630–682 A.D., the Eastern T'u Chueh were employed as enthusiastic mercenaries in China's attacks on the Western T'u Chueh.

Also, in 649 A.D., the Uighur Turks (under their leader Djigin), occupying an area just west of the Altai range, provided 50,000 men to the Chinese war effort.

By 841 A.D., the Kirghiz Turks are the dominant tribe in the confederacy. Under their red standards and led by their Ayet, they vied with the Khitan for power in the Central Steppes. Notably, these Kirghiz were tall, had reddish hair, were white, tanned in complexion, and had greenish eyes. These men had a curious custom of tattooing only their hands.

By the time of the Khitan Empire (Liao) ca. 900–1100 A.D., the Ghei tribe enter into alliance with these new “Chinese” conquerors. The Ghei are unique for this area and time, in that their total strength lies in foot archers and unarmored cavalry.

TACTICS
The average T'u Chueh cavalryman was armored, and it is with these soldiers that reliance in battle was placed. Camels, (of which there were a considerable number) were used in reserve to disrupt a mounted enemy.

The superstition of the moon’s cycle persists. Raids are still only conducted during the cycle of the waxing moon.

Approximate Composition of the T'u Chueh Army
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored light Camelry</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Camelry</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Cavalry</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored Cavalry</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghei allied Unarmored infantry archers</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghei allied Unarmored cavalry horse archers</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOKHARIAN AND KUCHAN STATES

Located in the area of Turfan, the Tokharians (possibly the ancient "Tokharoi") have been in contact with Chinese forces at least from 108 B.C. In PanCh’ao’s great “march to the Roman Empire” the Chinese again encountered the Tokharians — this time Turfan surrendered without a fight. The Tokharians are the red-haired and blue-eyed people that could be descended from Scandinavians who migrated eastward to Siberia and then south. The Wu·Sun, Sogdians, Bactrians, Scythians, some T’u Chueh tribes (T’o-pa), some Mongolian tribes (Yakka), and the Kushan, not to mention the enigmatic “Aryans”, may be relatives of these alien people. Whenever contact was made with the above peoples, Chinese and Indian historians carefully noted the physical differences. These Tokharians, the Chieh-ku, were the stock that would form the Byzantine Varangian Guard in 620 A.D.

Kucha was the largest city state of the Tarim River Basin complex. Commonly called an “Oasis Kingdom”, in antiquity the Tarim Basin was much more fertile and prosperous than it is today.

In its earlier history, Kucha was not very powerful — as was the case with the other 35 states that formed the Basin.

However, by 630–644 A.D. the state of Kucha under their sovereign, King Ho-li Pu-shih-pi, amalgamated a formidable army with which to fight T’ang Chinese expansion. A strong force of armored cavalry were only defeated by a combined Chinese, T’u Chueh, and Uighur army that ironically lured the Kuchan force into a defeat via the Central Asian stratagem of feigning rout.

**Approximate Composition of the Tokharian and Kuchan Armies:**

**Tokharian Armies:**
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

- Armored infantry = 10%
- Unarmored skirmishers = 100%
- Unarmored cavalry = 5%

**Kuchan Armies:**

- Armored cavalry on partially armored horses = 5%
- Armored cavalry = 90%
- Unarmored cavalry = 5%
THE ISLAMS AND TIBETANS

The caliph successor to Muhammad sent Arab mercenaries to aid Li Shih-min in his take over in China. Thus, an uneasy alliance now existed between the Islamic and Chinese worlds.

In 674 A.D. Sassanid Persia, then also an ally of T’ang China, sent urgent word to the T’ang Emperor requesting aid against invading swarms of Islamic cavalry.

This plea fell on deaf ears as no help was sent. Sassanid Persia was overrun as was Bactria and Sogdiana, both of which had also requested aid.

From 707–713, the Arabs were content with consolidating their power on the western borders of China and in the Tarim Basin. By 712 A.D. when the Isams under Muhammad·bin·Qasim were attacking another of the Oasis Kingdoms and India’s King Dahir, the Bactrians and Syrians were allied with the Arabs.

After 713 A.D., the Arabs began to push the Chinese Empire east, thus expanding their own boundaries. Along the way they picked up Tibetans (T‘u-tan) as allies.

This alliance was challenged by the Chinese General Kao Hsien-chih who, à la Hannibal, crossed the Pamirs and arrived behind the Arab-Tibetan Army. This was only a stalling move, however, as the Khitan also turned on China at this time. By 751 A.D. the Khitan had defeated the Chinese at the Liao River while the Arabs subdued them in 752 A.D. at the Talas River.

ISLAMIC AND TIBETAN ARMIES:
The Islamic armies consisted of a mounted force of unarmored horse archers and cameleers, armored cavalry, and artillery with a small portion of infantry.

Islamic sultanates provided most of the fighting force while auxiliaries such as Syrians and Bactrians were sometimes called in.

The decimal system again prevailed as a unit of ten men was called a sar·i-khalid (after the commander); a unit of 100, a sipah-salar; of 1,000, an amir; of 10,000, a malik. In Muhammad·bin·Qasim’s army of 712 A.D. were 6,000 camels and a baggage train of an additional 3,000 camels.

Islamic infantry were completely secondary to the cavalry. Although armed with bow and swords, they seldom were used for anything but support. The cavalry reigned at first, though in the later Seljuk period supported infantry would dominate.

The Tibetan forces remain a bit of a mystery at lower level organization, although the decimal system seems likely. In 773 A.D. the Tibetan forces were grouped into four armies or “horns”. The Chinese historians calculated that the one horn facing the Chinese border consisted of 200,000 men.

The Tibetans relied almost exclusively on their armored cavalry while their long-time ally Nepal provided bow armed infantry.

In 1270 A.D. the Tibetans fell to Kublai Khan — not by defeat but by diplomatic upheaval. Kublai Khan declared the Tibetan monarchy dissolved, and installed the Abbot of Sakya Monastery, who happened to be quite popular and pro-Mongol, as sovereign.

The Mongol Empire had a new and powerful ally.
Approximate Composition of Islamic, Tibetan, and Nepalese Armies
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

Islamic Armies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored horse archers</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Cavalry</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillerists</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameleers</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary unarmored cavalry</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tibetan Armies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored cavalry</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather armored cavalry</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nepalese:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored archers</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(of the Tibetan-Nepalese Army)
THE KHITAN (LIAO)

The Liao Dynasty, occupying much of northern China, was established by the Khitan. The Khitan, a pre-Mongol Steppe culture, swarmed out of what would now be southeastern Mongolia and smashed the P'o-hai Kingdom of the Liao-tung peninsula.

This period, the early 10th century A.D., was already the scene of the disintegration of the T'ang Dynasty, therefore, when the Khitan moved south, there was not much opposition.

In 946 A.D., they sacked the capitol of the Five Dynasties Kingdom of the Later Chin. This brought direct contact with the Sung Dynasty, for in the 11th century, the Sung were forced to pay a humiliating tribute to these Khitan for an unsteady peace.

The Khitan Empire, which was to occupy most of Mongolia and Central China, in addition to Northern China, was known as the Liao Empire.

ORGANIZATION

The Liao Army was based on the use of cavalry almost exclusively. The Ordo was the basic unit of organization, and from this word we can trace a term we are all familiar with. The Chinese term for the Ordo—“wo-lu-to”, and the Hunnic “ou-t'o” meaning King, give us the source for the Khitan word “Ordo”. It is how “Ordo” is translated into our western languages that is highly significant. In Polish, Portuguese and Spanish, Ordo becomes horda. In Swedish, it is hord. In German and Danish we have the familiar English word, horde.

A typical Ordo under the Emperor T'ai-tsu (10th century A.D.), constituted of Bodyguards and retainers; P'o-hai POW’s; resettled Chinese and Khitan Armored cavalry shock troops; and a few conscripted levies from the occupied territories.

Sizes of these ordos varied from time to time, and only “paper-strengths” are known. The Khitan shock troops are the only reliable soldiers in the ordo—the other prisoners and retainers seldom fought with the ordo.

In 951 A.D., an ordo consisted of 2,000 armored cavalry; by 983 A.D., 3,000; in 1031 A.D., 5,000; and by 1125, 6,000.

In addition to the basic ordos, the Liao Army maintained certain allied tribal auxiliaries. For example, in 986 A.D., the Jurchen joined the Liao after suffering a defeat at their hands. It is probably at this time that the Jurchen learn of the Liao art of warfare, and retain enough to defeat them later. These tribal allies were organized as were the Liao, with the exception that the best fighters were grouped in an elite unit.

The Militia constituted the final portion of the Liao Army, and were the bottom of the heap. In the Militia were found the Chinese and conscript Khitan infantry, the crossbowmen, and the artillery. These were used mostly for the “dirty work” of seiges and the like. When utilized in combat, they were usually the “cannon fodder” to preserve the cavalry.

The basic unit organization of the ordo was the regiment or battalion of 500–700 men, divided into companies of 100.

Ten regiments constituted an Ordo or Column. Ten columns (ordos) would create an Army or Side.

The vanguard for a typical army would be 3,000 unarmored cavalry.
It is not known whether ordos were combined or composite-arm organizations, or whether they were exclusively armored cavalry formations. A description of an ordo in battle leads me to believe that within an ordo there would be three regiments of unarmored light cavalry, four regiments of armored cavalry, and three regiments of armored cavalry on partially armored horses.

The following is a list of the twelve ordos of the Emperor T'ai-tsu. The first name is the commander's name, or whom the ordo is delegated to protect (much like "The Queen's Own"). After this is the name of the ordo, the English translation of the name, and then the number of cavalry in the Ordo.

1. T'ai-tsu; Suan; (The Emperor's Own); 6,000
2. Empress Ying-t'ien P'u; P'u-su-wan; (Development); 5,000
3. T'ai-tsung; Ku-o-a-lien; (To rule the Country); 5,000
4. Shih-tsung; Yeh-lu-wan; (Prosperity); 8,000
5. Mu-tsung; To-li-pén; (To Pacify); 2,000
6. Ching-tsung; Chien-mu; (To Transmit); 10,000
7. Empress Dowager Ch'~ng-t'ien; Ku-wen; (Jade); 10,000
8. Sheng-tsung; Nü-kü; (Gold); 5,000
9. Hsing-tsung; Wo-tu-wan; (Propagation); 10,000
10. Tao-tsung; A-assi; (Extensive); 15,000
11. T'ien-tsu; A-lu-wan; (To Assist); 10,000
12. Hsiao-wén; Ch'ih-shih-te-pén; (Filial Piety); 5,000

TRAINING
The Liao were trained in units of five or ten men, and, like the later Mongols, they were warned that should any member of the unit be guilty of misconduct or worse, the entire unit would be punished equally. This naturally creates a very strict and quite harsh discipline. The system must have degenerated for the Jurchen to have conquered them so easily.

The units were well-trained in their combat roles, and all were instructed in logistical self-support. The unique tactic of relieving fatigued front line troops with fresh troops was practised incessantly so that there might never be a foul-up in battle.

TACTICS
A typical deployment of the Liao Army, was to have the Ordos arranged rather like the Roman Legion formation of Simplex Acies, or, Ordos in battle line, with intervals or spaces between each ordo. Flanks would be relegated to the auxiliary cavalry. In order of battle, the unarmored cavalry would form the van, followed at 100 yards distance by the armored cavalry on unarmored horses, followed at 100 yards distance by the armored cavalry on partially armored horses. To the rear of this force would be found the Chinese engineers, artillerists, and the Militia, ready to be marched up through the intervals if necessary.

When deploying and maneuvering, pre-arranged code names were shouted to bring units into their proper places in the battle line. Three rolls of the "great Drum" signalled the advance, a blast of the trumpets indicated halt, and a clash of gongs and conch shells— the charge.

The Liao followed the time-honoured Scythic tactic of volley upon volley of arrows, followed by close support and exploitation by the armored cavalry.

The tactic of relieving fatigued front line troops with fresh troops, gave an incessantly attacking front line of fresh troops that almost invariably reduced her enemies to defeat.

Another reason for the Liao Army's great success in battle, is that most of her foes—the surrounding tribes or Chinese Kingdoms—consisted mainly of light cavalry horse archers, not much of a foe for the
trained Liao armored horseman. Also, non-cooperation between the tribes signalled their falling to the Liao via “piecemeal” tactics.

By this time, the Chinese Army, had, once again, depreciated into “mobs” of infantry, ill-trained and poorly motivated. Hence, the superiority of the Liao.

**Approximate Composition of the Khitan (Liao) Army**

Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

- Khitan unarmored cavalry = 30%
- Khitan armored cavalry = 40%
- Khitan armored cavalry on partially armored horses = 30%
- Tribal auxiliary unarmored cavalry = 25%
- Militia infantry = 20%
- Chinese artillery = 5%

It has been postulated that, after 1114 A.D., not more than 2% of the total Khitan armored cavalry had all of it’s assigned equipment (including the armor for the horse).
THE QARA-KHITAN

Early in the 12th century, the Liao Empire was attacked by her one-time ally, the Jurchen. The Jurchen Army had learned much from the Liao, and the Liao power was crushed. Aiding the Jurchen in their campaign, lasting from 1114 A.D. – 1125 A.D., were the Chinese of the Southern Sung Dynasty, Liao’s southern neighbor. The Jurchen then established in this area the Chin Dynasty, friendly and allied to the Sung. The Chin Dynasty, in turn, would fall to the Mongols in 1234 A.D.

This was not to be the final chapter on the Khitan (Liao) Dynasty, however. After the fall of the Liao to the Jurchen, a group of Liao tribes managed to flee westward and established the nation of the Qara-Khitan, also known as the “Black Khitan”.

These Khitan tribesmen, a constant annoyance to the Mongolian tribes, managed to last from 1143–1211 A.D., and were finally subdued by the Jenghis Khan.

QARA-KHITAN ORDO
The army, as would be expected, was very similar to their “parents”, the Liao.

Organization was exactly like the Liao ordo, but with a higher proportion of unarmored, and not as many armored, cavalry.

By this time, the Ordo was stabilized at 10,000 men each. Battalions or regiments of 500–700 men were still the rule, but there were now a few at 1,000.

An army for the Qara-Khitans, however, was but three ordos.

Some Khitan infantry would still be present, but only for minor tasks and for the occasional siege.

Approximate Composition of the Qara-Khitan Army
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qara-Khitan unarmored cavalry</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qara-Khitan armored cavalry</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qara-Khitan armored cavalry on partially armored horses</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia infantry</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE JURCHEN

It was very difficult to decide precisely where these people should be placed, for they are neither Mongolian, Khitan, nor Hsiung-nu. They occupied the area just east of the lands of the Hsiung-nu, what is present day northern Manchuria.

The Jurchen were never really a threat to anyone, though small border wars occurred sporadically over the centuries until the 12th century A.D.

With the Khitan (Liao) Empire established, delusions of grandeur followed, and ultimately the Liao invasion of Jurchen lands resulted in a ferocity unencountered by the Khitan to that time.

Perhaps there were an incredible number of Jurchen soldiers, perhaps the Liao military system had badly degenerated; it is not known. The Jurchen warriors smashed into Khitan-held lands and extinguished the Liao Dynasty.

The Qara-Khitan fled to the west, the Jurchen “Chin” Dynasty followed until the Jurchen were, in turn, absorbed by the Jenghis Khan and his Mongols.

ORGANIZATION

Very little can be gleaned from any source concerning the Jurchen military system. Probably the best source to date is by Jingshen Tao. This article gives a cursory insight into Jurchen organization.

The rank or title of Po-chi-leh is a rank above a Meng-an (a commander of 1,000) but just how much higher is not mentioned. A Mou-k’e commands a unit of between 100–300 men.

The paintings we have only show heavily armored Jurchen warriors, but lightly armored cavalry probably accompanied these.

Approximate Composition of the Jurchen Army

Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

- Armored cavalrymen on partially armored horses = 10%
- Unarmored cavalry = 10%
- Armored cavalrymen on unarmored horses = 90%
- Unarmored cavalrymen on unarmored horses = 20%
THE SELJUK TURKS

The 13th Century dawned in Russian Turkestan still under the influence of the Islamic sultanates, then called "Khorezm". This principality of the Seljuks, along with the Caliphate at Baghdad, fell in a brief three year campaign that incorporated the Tigris-Euphrates Valley and all land east into the Mongolian Empire under the Khanate of Il-Khans. Over the years since the Islamic invasions of the 8th Century A.D., the armies had degenerated on this eastern front. By 1219, when the legions of the Jenghis Khan advanced on the Empire of Khorezm (after defeating the Qara-Khitans), the Mongol Army simply out-classed in every way this remnant of past glories.

ORGANIZATION:
To date, information on the Seljuk and Islamic army organization has been very sketchy. Recently Phil Barker happened upon a copy of a translated Arab military manual and published an article in the Journal of the Society of Ancients (#55, September, 1974, pages 13-16) entitled "A Medieval Arab Military Manual".

This article is an extremely informative one and details the organization and tactics of the Arabic armies.

Ideally, the organization began with a unit of 16 spear-bearers or 8 archers, termed a saff al-magatir. The usbah consisted of 32 men; a miqab had 64, a kurdus, 128; a jahfal, 256; a kabkabah, 512; a zumrah, 1,024; a taifah, 2,048; a jash, 4,096; a khamis, 8,192; and an al-asfar al-azam, 16,384.

Another mentioned form of organization, possibly of the cavalry arm, was of a khamshah of 5 cavalry; an ashrah of 10–20; a tablikhanah of 80; and an alf of 1,000. Katibahs of infantry (500–800 men) and faylag (5,000 men) are also mentioned.

The organization of Muhammad-bin-Qasim, ca 712 A.D., called for a straight decimal system in which 10 men formed a sar-i-khalil similar to the ashrah; and an amir — identical to an alf, each of 1,000.

I agree with Mr. Barker in that the elaborate system of 64, 128, 256, . . . etc. was perhaps never actually used. The second part of the organization mentioned — that of Khamshah, ashrah, alf, and so forth, was probably the organization practiced. An hypothesis made in the article by Mr. Barker that I cannot verify but seems logical postulates that standard units employed in battle were the katibah of infantry and the jahfal of cavalry, with independent squadrons (kurdus) of unarmored cavalry used in a supporting role.

TACTICS:
The army deployed in battle order in five lines. Infantry occupied the initial line, (divided into units of 1,000), supported by the cavalry, (divided into units of 3,000), in the second line. The third line contained the baggage and guards. The fourth consisted of the unarmored cavalry and guarded the rear of the baggage line. The fifth line guarded the entire army’s rear and probably consisted of cavalry. "Flying wings" of unarmored cavalry units would protect the flanks of the army.

In the advance, the infantry bore the brunt of the enemy missiles thus serving to preserve the cavalry. When the enemy routed, the Arabs were careful in the pursuit, halting and observing the fleeing enemy rather than pursuing blindly. Interestingly enough, it seems these were one people that identified the eastern “feign defeat and lure into pursuit” tactic and responded sensibly to it.

The infantry’s front ranks consisted of the spear armed troops with the archers in the rear to support the initial ranks with massive archery fire.
Night and pre-dawn attacks on enemy camps were favorite tactics of these early armies and an elaborate system of disrupting enemy communications and demoralization of enemy units was practiced.

Approximate Composition of the Seljuk Turkish Army:
Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armored riders on partially armored horses</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored cavalry</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored cavalry</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather armored infantry</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored archers or skirmishing infantry</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmored cameleers</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elephants</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>